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In January 2012, President Obama released the
National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security.
International trade has been and continues to be a
powerful engine of the United States and global
economic growth. The many cybersecurity challenges
facing the U.S. include one of which many Americans
are unaware – the serious threat posed by
vulnerabilities in the cyber supply chain. Of the many
components – including hardware, firmware, and
software – that compose a technological product, most
contain elements stemming from a broad global
market, making it difficult to ascertain the complete
security of an end product. With the market for
technological goods and components continuing to
rapidly grow every year, and with everything from
missiles to smartphones relying on these information
products, the need for mutual trust cyber supply chain
security has never been more critical.
Enhancing the security of any national interests’
technological supply chain must not destroy the wellfunctioning international market for technology.
Instead of the two extremes of “intrusive government
mandates” or “do nothing,” the U.S. government is
promoting development of private-sector systems for
securing and accrediting technology companies that
would allow customers – from the federal government
to small businesses – to make more informed and riskbased decisions.
Organizations of all types (business, academia,
government, etc.) are facing risks resulting from their
ever- increasing reliance on the information
infrastructure. Decision and policy makers managing
these risks are challenged by a lack of information
intelligence concerning the risks and consequences of
cyber events (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPAA, and
Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACT). They need to understand
the implications of cyber security risks and solutions
related to their information infrastructure and business.
Risk management investment decisions, within the
context of mutual trust among supply chains should
involve: (i) a comprehensive approach to cyber
security risk management, (ii) credible appropriate data
needed to support intelligent decisions, and (iii)
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assessment of the impacts resulting from the various
investment alternatives. Sound, rational IT/business
decisions require a comprehensive understanding of
the dynamics of information intelligence and the likely
effects of cyber security investment choices.
As our dependence on the cyber infrastructure and
their associated supply chains grow ever larger, more
complex, and more distributed, the systems that
compose them become more prone to failures and/or
exploitation. Trusted Supply Chains values currency
and relevance over detail and accuracy. Information
explosion describes the pervasive abundance of
(public/private) information and the effects of such.
Gathering, analyzing, and making use of information
constitutes a business- / sociopolitical- / militaryintelligence gathering activity and ultimately poses
significant advantages and liabilities to the
survivability of "our" society. The combination of
increased vulnerability, increased stakes and increased
threats make supply chains and their associated
processes one of the most important emerging
challenges in the evolution of modern cyberspace
"mechanization."
In their contribution DANE Trusted Email for
Supply Chain Management, Joseph Gersch, Dan
Massey, and Scott Rose demonstrate the need for
trusted email in supply chain management. Spear
phishing, forgery, and other attacks can result in data
breaches, industrial and government espionage,
installation of malware, and financial theft. DANE
email extensions are then posited as a solid foundation
for global trusted email. The IETF protocol ‘Domain
Authentication of Named Entities’ (DANE) described
in this paper has been extended from its initial goal of
providing TLS web site validation to also offer a
foundation for globally scalable and interoperable
email security.
In the second paper A Structured Analysis of SQL
Injection Runtime Mitigation Techniques, Stu Steiner,
Daniel Conte de Leon, and Jim Alves-Foss address
SQL injection attacks (SQLIA) which still remain one
of the most commonly occurring and exploited
vulnerabilities. A considerable amount of research
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concerning SQLIA mitigation techniques has been
conducted with the primary resulting solution requiring
developers to code defensively. Although, defensive
coding is a valid solution, the current market demand
for websites is being filled by inexperienced
developers with little knowledge of secure
development practices. This paper presents an in-depth
analysis and classification, based on Formal Concept
Analysis, of the 10 major SQLIA runtime mitigation
techniques. Based on this analysis, one technique was
identified that shows the greatest potential for
transition to enterprise use. This analysis also serves as
an enhanced SQLIA mitigation classification system.
In the third paper Reverse Engineering Integrated
Circuits Using Finite State Machine Analysis,” Jessica
Smith, Kiri Oler, Carl Miller, and David Manz expand
their prior work, in which they proposed a novel
method of reverse engineering the finite state machines
(FSMs) that integrated circuits are built upon in a nondestructive and highly specific manner. In this paper,
the authors present a methodology for reverse
engineering
integrated
circuits,
including
a
mathematical verification of a scalable algorithm used
to generate minimal FSM representations of integrated
circuits. The method demonstrates that given an
isolated state machine with a reset capability, the
machine is modeled using a tree framework which
allows for machine to machine comparisons and the
comparison of states within the machine to find an
optimal representation. Through this method it is
possible to take a state machine-based IC and, using
only the standard input and output pins, re-discover the

original FSM. Consequently, they can determine if the
in-silicon FSM matches the designed FSM, or
rediscover the functionality of an unknown IC. Both
capabilities provide a non-destructive means of
validation for security purposes.
In the final paper Towards a Cyber Defense
Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power
Consumption Monitoring, Jarilyn Hernández Jiménez,
Qian Chen, Jeffrey Nichols, Chelsea Calhoun, and
Summer Sykes present a Supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) testbed they developed with the
objective to detect cyber-attacks by monitoring and
analyzing the power consumption of a Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC). The power consumption of the
PLC was monitored under three attack scenarios:
command injection, Denial of Service (DoS), and
replay. Results shown that these cyberattacks leave a
detectable signal on the power consumption of a PLC
and in route to these results, the authors found and
describe vulnerabilities in the DF-1 protocol (an
asynchronous byte-oriented protocol used to
communicate between the HMI and the PLC via the
RS232 link).
The goal of this inaugural minitrack is to challenge,
establish and debate a far-reaching agenda that broadly
and comprehensively outlines a strategy for mutual
trust, cyber security, efficiency, and resilience of our
vital global supply chain infrastructure research that is
founded on sound principles and technologies.
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